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Abstract 
 
Using panel data for 24 (OECD) countries during the period 1980–2004 this study 
examines how social trust affects fertility. The major finding through the random effects 
approach is that the social trust increases the fertility rate. A 1% rise in the trust rate 
leads to an increase in fertility by 0.01 points. The results presented here suggest that 
in developed countries, trust underlies the desirable circumstances for child rearing. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As a consequence of the declines experienced in most OECD countries, fertility rates
1
 have 
fallen below the level needed to ensure generational replacement (roughly 2.1 children per 
woman) (Sleebos, 2003). The few countries with fertility rates above this replacement value 
include Mexico and Turkey (at 2.2 children per woman), and Iceland and the United States (at 
2.1 children per woman) (OECD, 2009). Decreased fertility is thought to influence social and 
economic conditions. From an economic view point, low fertility rates lead to a reduction in the 
working-age population, which in turn hampers economic growth
2
. It must also be recognized 
that fertility and economic growth are linked endogenously and thus influence each other. 
Economic growth depends in part on input factors, such as labor and capital. On the other 
hand, the socio-economic background of society is considered to contribute to economic growth. 
For instance, the role played by trust has been given much attention by researchers (La Porta et 
al., 1997; Uslaner, 2002, Bjørnskov, 2006, 2010, 2011; Berggren and Jordahl, 2006; Huang et al., 
2009; Sabatini, 2008, 2009)
3
. The existing literature shows that social trust accelerates economic 
growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Algan and Cahuc, 2010). There are several potential channels 
through which social trust enhances economic growth. For instance, the classical work of Zak 
and Knack (2001) suggests that social trust improves efficiency by alleviating the moral hazard 
problem, resulting in increased investment and thus economic growth. Bjørnskov (2011) 
provided evidence of a transmission mechanism whereby trust influences schooling and the rule 
of law directly, and that this affects economic growth. This argument is in part supported by 
                                                   
1 The total fertility rate represents the ratio between the number of births in a given 
year and the average number of women of reproductive age (15-49 years).  
2 There is empirical evidence in the literature suggesting an inverse relationship 
between fertility and the growth rate of per capita income (Barro, 1991).  
3 Social trust is regarded as a form of social capital (Putnam, 1993, 2000). 
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evidence that social trust enhances human capital formation (Papagapitos & Riley, 2009; 
Bjørnskov, 2009; Yamamura, 2011). 
In discussions about the fertility rate in developed countries, such as those in the OECD, it is 
important to consider “trade-offs confronting individual women between having children, on 
one side, and taking advantage of the education and employment opportunity available to them” 
(Sleebos, 2003, p. 19). Women‟s decisions regarding fertility depend on the economic costs and 
benefits (Becker, 1981). Hence a rise in women‟s wage level increases the opportunity cost of 
giving birth and childcare (Galor and Weil, 1996). One of the costs of fertility for working 
women is finding a reliable nursery, and so supply of childcare services is important (Apps and 
Rees, 2004; Martinez and Iza, 2004). However, there seems to be a principal–agent problem 
between parents and childcare workers, because the behavior of childcare workers cannot be 
well monitored by the parents (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Housewives also confront a similar 
situation. Children go to school, where they learn from the teachers. However, the behavior of 
teachers cannot be monitored by the parents, resulting in a principal–agent problem. Due to this 
problem, parents appear to spend much time searching for a „good‟ nursery (or school), and so 
search costs are high. As a consequence, the childcare and education markets cannot function 
well, which increases the cost of having a child. 
Principal–agent problems are less important in high-trust societies (North, 1990, pp. 32-33). 
High social trust is negatively correlated with the likelihood of principal–agent problems4. 
Therefore, nursery and education markets function well in high-trust societies. The cost of 
searching for nurseries and schools is thus higher in a distrustful society than in a trustful society. 
                                                   
4  Trust can be distinctly divided into particularized trust and generalized trust 
(Uslaner, 2002). Generalized trust is defined as ‘the perception that most people are 
part of your moral community’ (Uslaner, 2002, p.26). On the other hand, ‘Particularized 
trusters have positive views of their own in-group and negative attitudes toward groups 
to which they do not belong’ (Uslaner, 2002, p. 28). In this paper, we define social trust 
to be equivalent to generalized trust.  
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All in all, these implications lead us to conclude that social trust increases fertility. However, 
little is known about the relationship between social trust and fertility, and it would be 
worthwhile to investigate this relationship. The purpose of this paper is to explore how and to 
what extent social trust increases fertility rates using panel data from 24 OECD countries. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. An explanation of the data set is provided in 
Section II. Section III presents a simple econometric framework. The results of the estimations 
and a discussion are provided in Section IV. The final section offers concluding observations. 
 
II. DATA AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
This study uses panel data covering the 24 year period 1980–2004. As shown in Table 
A1 in the Appendix, 24 OECD countries are used in this study, including all 20 original 
OECD members. With the exception of South Korea, the other countries included in this 
study joined the OECD prior to 1980. 
This paper uses data from several sources. Crude birth rates are taken from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database (World Bank, 2006). Among the 
set of explanatory variables are: trust, income, divorce rate, unemployment rate and 
income inequality. Our key variable for trust is taken from the World Values Survey 
(WVS)5. Trust is measured by the proportion of people who think that most people can 
be trusted. This proxy for trust has previously been used in various studies to represent 
generalized trust (Leigh, 2006; Bjørnskov, 2007, 2009; Uslaner, 2002). The WVS has 
been conducted five times between 1981 and 2005. However, the year when WVS was 
conducted varies according to country which is why that there is no panel-structured 
                                                   
5 The data is available from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org (accessed on Jan 10, 
2011). 
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data for trust. The value of trust provided by WVS is a well-functioning and reliable 
measure, and is remarkably stable within a country over time (Bjørnskov, 2007; Uslaner, 
2002). Hence, we use mainly data collected in 1990, since this is close to the mid-point of 
the period studied in this paper6. 
As a measure of income, we use the per capita real gross domestic product adjusted 
for purchasing power parity (PPP, expressed in constant 2000 US dollars) taken from 
the Penn World Tables (PWT 6.3) (Heston et al., 2009)7. Income inequality is measured 
by Gini coefficients extracted from the Standardized Income Inequality Database (Stolt, 
2009). Harmonized unemployment rates are taken from the OECD database8. We also 
use the female labor participation rate (as a percentage of the total labor force) taken 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database (World Bank, 2006), 
and crude divorce rates (per 1,000 people) are taken from the United Nations Common 
Database, Demographic Yearbook9. 
It was reported in Sleebos (2003) that the average fertility rate across countries has 
declined during the period 1980–2003, as plotted in Figure 1. Regarding average GDP, 
we observe from Figure 2 that GDP has increased monotonically in the same period. 
Combining these observations from Figures 1 and 2, we infer that GDP growth results 
in decreased fertility10. GDP growth seems to be positively associated with wage rate. 
Therefore, this is consistent with the argument that the high opportunity cost of giving 
                                                   
6 WVS was not conducted in 1990 for some countries and so we used the data for a 
different year as follows. Data for New Zealand was collected in 1998, for Australia in 
1995, for Switzerland in 1989 and for Greece in 1999. 
7 This can be downloaded from http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php. 
8 Available from http://stats.oecd.org (accessed on May 10, 2010). 
9 Available from http://data.un.org/Default.aspx (accessed on May 10, 2010). 
10 The reverse causality is unlikely to hold. This is because a decline in fertility rates 
results in a reduction in the labor force. If this is so, then lower fertility rates mean 
lower economic growth rates. However, Figures 1 and 2 together do not suggest such 
relation. 
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birth reduces the incentive to have a child (Becker, 1981). 
The average fertility rate between 1980 and 2004 is displayed on the vertical axis in 
Figure 3, which shows that fertility rates vary considerably across countries. The 
highest fertility rates are reported in Ireland (2.2), Iceland (2.1) and New Zealand (2.0). 
The lowest fertility rates are found in Italy (1.32), Germany (1.36) and Spain (1.43). On 
the other hand, we also observe the large variation in the trust rate between countries. 
The countries with the highest rate of social trust, around 60%, includes Scandinavian 
countries such as Norway, Sweden and Finland, while the lowest rate, approximately 
20%, contains Mediterranean countries such as France and Portugal. Figure 3 reveals 
that trust rates are positively associated with fertility rates. 
 
III. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND MODEL 
 
We estimate the determinants of fertility rates and use the panel data for OECD 
countries to control for the unobservable year-specific and country-specific effects. 
Following Narayan and Peng (2001) and Masih and Masih (2000), the estimated 
reduced model takes the following form: 
FERTIL it  =  α1 TRUSTt-+ α2 INCOMit  +α3 UNEMPit  it  
+α4 GINI it  +α5 FLABit +α6 DIVit +kt +εi+ωit ,    (1) 
where FERTIL is the (total) fertility rate of country i in year t, and α represents the 
regression parameter. The variable kt represents the unobservable year-specific effects 
of year t, which is controlled for by dummy variables. εi and ωit represent the individual 
effects for country i (a time-invariant fixed effect vector) and the error term for country i 
in year t, respectively. The fixed effects of εi can be captured by the fixed effects 
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approach (Baltagi, 2005). However, TRUST is also assumed to be time-invariant and so 
is captured by εi. That is, TRUST cannot be estimated by the fixed effects model and 
thus the random effects model is used in this paper to estimate the effects of TRUST. 
Table 1 displays the summary statistics and definitions of the variables used in the 
empirical analysis. As explained, the data set concerns 24 countries over 24 years, and 
so the results for each variable show considerable variation. Although OECD countries 
are considered to be developed, the maximum value of INCOM (per capita income) is 
USD68.3 which is about 13 times larger than the minimum value USD5.4. As for 
UNEMP (unemployment rate), the maximum value of 19.5 is also about 13 times larger 
than the minimum value of 1.5. 
The coefficient of TRUST is predicted to be positive because, as argued earlier, social 
trust plays a role in improving the circumstances for parents raising a child. INCOM 
and UNEMP are included to capture economic factors. INCOM is expected to negatively 
impact fertility rates. This is because higher income levels increase the opportunity cost 
of giving birth. We expect UNEMP and GINI to have negative coefficients, because 
higher unemployment rates and GINI values increase the crime rate and so make 
circumstances less suitable for childcare. FLAB (female labor participation) and DIV 
(divorce rate) are thought to be associated with fertility (Sleebos, 2003). Higher female 
labor participation reduces time available for childcare, and hence, also reduces the 
incentive to have a child. Divorce destroys stable partnerships between male and female, 
and therefore, reduces fertility rate11. Children constitute marital capital (Becker et al., 
1977). One argument is that couples produce more goods valuable inside their 
                                                   
11 It should be noted that at the end of the 1990s births occurring outside marriages 
appeared to increase, and that female employment rates are positively associated with 
fertility (Sleebos, 2003). 
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relationship than outside the relationship. Divorce or separation can reduce the value of 
marriage and decrease the probability of having children, implying lower fertility 
rates12. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 2 displays our estimation results. The random effects estimation is valid when 
the null hypothesis is such that the two estimates, the fixed effects model and the 
random effects model, do not differ systematically (Baltagi, 2005). If the null hypothesis 
is not rejected, then the random effects model is preferred. Before discussing the results, 
we conduct a Hausman test (1978). In columns (1) and (2), the p-values are 0.95 and 
0.56, suggesting that the null hypothesis should not be rejected. There are no 
differences between FE and RE. Hence, the random effects estimations are preferred. 
There is a potential reverse causality between FLAB and fertility rates. That is, the 
presence of small children may increase the amount of work at home, which may reduce 
the desire of the mother to search for a job. On the other hand, the presence of small 
children increases the needs for additional income, which may increase the necessity of 
women seeking for employment. With respect to the relationship between DIV and 
fertility rates, there is also a possible reverse causality. If a couple has a small child of 
school age, divorce is less likely to occur because divorce seems to have a negative effect 
on childcare. These factors could lead to endogeneity bias and so we cancel the effects of 
FLAB and DIV in the specification shown in column (2)13. 
                                                   
12 There are also several studies that examine the impact of unilateral and non-fault 
divorce laws on the fertility rate (Drewianka, 2006; Alesina and Giuliano, 2006; 
Stevenson, 2007). 
13 It should be noted that omitted-variable bias occurs in column (2) of Table 2. Hence, 
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We begin our discussion with the results of Table 2. The coefficient of TRUST is 
positive as anticipated, and is statistically significance in columns (1) and (2). Further, 
the absolute values of the coefficient are 0.01 in both columns. This means that a 1% 
increase in the rate of trust results in a 0.01 point increase in the fertility rate. 
Concerning the control variables, with the exception of DIV in column (1), the 
coefficients all have the predicted signs. However, the negative coefficient of INCOM is 
statistically significant in column (2) but not in column (1). The absolute value in 
column (1) is 0.15, while that in column (2) is 0.57. There is a large difference in the 
absolute value of the INCOM coefficient between columns (1) and (2). Hence the impact 
of INCOM is thought to be unstable according in our specifications. UNEMP has a 
negative coefficient, and this is statistically significant at the 1% level in both columns 
(1) and (2). The absolute values of this coefficient are 0.01 in both columns. This result 
indicates that a 1% increase in the unemployment rate reduces the fertility rate by 0.01 
points. The negative coefficient of GINI is statistically significant in column (1) but not 
in column (2), and its absolute values are 0.52 and 0.93 in columns (1) and (2), 
respectively. This suggests that income inequality leads to a decrease in fertility rates, 
although the results for GINI are unstable for our specifications. Considering the 
results of UNEMP and GINI together tells us that insecure conditions caused by 
unemployment and income inequality reduce the parents’ incentive to have a child. 
With respect to FLAB, the coefficient is negative as expected and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The absolute value of this coefficient is 0.02, meaning that a 
1% increase in female labor participation reduces the fertility rate by 0.02 points. 
                                                                                                                                                     
instead of dropping FLAB and DIV, an instrumental variables approach to account for 
the endogeneity bias should be conducted for more precise estimation. However, good 
instruments cannot be easily found and are beyond the scope of this paper.  
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In summary, we argue that the fertility rate in OECD countries depends not only 
on economic conditions but also on social trust. The extent to which the childcare and 
education markets function effectively, seems to be important when parents make a 
decision on having a child. Social trust is thought to underlie a well-functioning 
childcare and education market, and so plays a critical role in increasing fertility rates. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The fact that fertility rates have declined in developed countries has been widely 
observed. A number of researchers have explored why fertility decreases as per capita 
income rises. Furthermore, social trust has been given much attention by researchers in 
various social sciences. For instance, the relationship between social trust and economic 
growth and its modes of transmission have both been investigated (Zak and Knack, 
2001; Bjørnskov, 2011). However, little is known about how social trust increases the 
labor force, and subsequently economic growth. 
The purpose of this paper is thus to examine how social trust affects fertility rates 
by using panel data for 24 OECD countries. The major finding through random effects 
estimation is that social trust increases the fertility rate. A 1% increase in the trust rate 
leads to an increase of fertility by 0.01 points. We interpret this as implying that trust 
underlies desirable circumstances for bringing up a child in developed countries. 
The empirical evidence presented here is based on data from 24 OECD countries. 
To more closely examine our results, it would be advantageous to use individual-level 
data. Furthermore, the endogeneity bias of female labor participation and divorce are 
not considered here, and should be controlled for by using an instrumental variables 
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approach. Finally, we assume that principal–agent problem is alleviated by social trust. 
Nevertheless, this assumption is not tested in this paper. These are issues remaining to 
be addressed in future research. 
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Figure 1. Changes in average fertility rates 
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Figure 2. Changes in averge per capita GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
1
.4
1
.6
1
.8
2
2
.2
F
e
rt
ili
ty
 r
a
te
20 30 40 50 60
Trust rate
 
Figure 3. Correlations between averate fertility rate and trust rate 
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Table 1 
Variable definitions, means, and standard deviations 
Variables Definition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Max Min 
FERTIL Total fertility rate 1.67 0.28 3.22 1.15 
TRUST Rate of those who generally trust others (%) 39.2 12.6 60.7 20.7 
INCOM Per capita income. 1000 US$    24.7 80.7 68.3    5.4 
UNEMP Unemployment rate (%) 7.14 3.50 19.5 1.5 
GINI Gini coefficient 0.28 0.04 0.37 0.19 
FLAB Female labor participation rate (%) 41.6 4.2 48.0 27.9 
DIV Divorce rate (%) 2.1 0.9 5.2 0.2 
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Table 2 
Determinants of fertility (random effects model).  
Dependent variable: Total fertility rate 
 
 (1) (2) 
TRUST 0.01*** 
(4.27) 
0.01** 
(2.53) 
INCOM -0.15 
(-1.42) 
-0.57*** 
(-4.88) 
UNEMP -0.01*** 
(-3.40) 
-0.01*** 
(-3.06) 
GINI -0.52** 
       (-2.50) 
-0.93 
(-1.22) 
FLAB -0.02*** 
(-3.67) 
 
DIV 0.001 
(0.04) 
 
Constant 
 
3.81*** 
(3.62) 
7.28*** 
(6.18) 
Observations 453 472 
Hausman test 16.6 
p-value=0.95 
24.2 
    p-value=0.56 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (one-sided tests). In all regression models, 
year dummy variables are included but are not reported to save space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX.  
Table A1. OECD countries included in the regression analysis   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia Greece Norway 
Austria Iceland Portugal 
Belgium Ireland South Korea 
Canada Italy Spain 
Denmark Japan Sweden 
Finland Luxembourg Switzerland 
France Netherlands United Kingdom 
Germany New Zealand United States 
